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- The socio-economic gap between West and East Europe is wide, and certainly 
wider than was the case in previous enlargements of the EU. After a deep 
recession in the early 1990s, growth has now resumed in several countries and the 
gap between these and the West has begun to narrow.
-Some CEE economies have clearly done better than others, so differentiation 
among the applicants to the EU is essential. The sustainability of high rates of 
growth is, however, open to question, and the gap will certainly not have 
disappeared before the accession of the first wave of CEE states.
- The decision to enlarge the EU eastwards has now been taken, on political and 
geo-strategic grounds. Nevertheless, economics remains the key determinant of 
the pace and methods by which integration of the new members can be achieved.
- While enlargement can be shown to bring many benefits not only to the new but 
also to existing member-states, public opinion on both sides is ambivalent. In the 
West, there are fears of increased competition from low-wage labour and the 
relocation of production to the east. In the East, there are concerns about the 
capacity of wide sectors of industry and agriculture to withstand the competitive 
pressures of full integration into the single market.
- A strategy of phased transitional arrangements is necessary to allow new 
member-states to adjust and develop before taking on the full acquis especially in 
such fields as labour regulation and the environment, which would pose a heavy 
burden on the CEE’s capacity to catch up, and thus increase the costs of 
integration to both existing and new member-states.
- An increase in the EU budget to ease the integration of new members seems to 
be ruled out politically, but budgetary reform is essential. Budgetary transfers will 
retain an important role in managing adjustment in both new and existing 
member-states.
- The challenge we face is to avert not only the development of a ’two-tier’ EU, 
but also deepening the divide between the first and second wave accession states. 
The latter should be included as far as possible in all preparations for 
enlargement. Sub-state regional cross-border cooperation can also make a vital 
contribution here.
- New costs are unavoidable in adjusting to the challenges of the new Europe and 
the new global economic context, whether the EU enlarges or not. But 





















































































































































































There is no doubt that there is a large socio-economic gap between the existing 
member-states of the EU and the prospective new entrants from Central and 
Eastern Europe. It is, moreover, larger than that which existed between 
member-states and new entrants at the time of previous enlargements which 
brought in Ireland (1973), Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986). But 
exactly how large that gap is, and whether it has narrowed or become wider and 
deeper as a result of the policies of post-communist economic transformation 
pursued over the past ten years, are questions of intense current controversy 
among economists.
Comparative data using official market exchange rates against the US 
dollar present a very bleak picture. Per capita GDP of the ten CEE associates in 
1997 ranged from the lowest at $1,198 in Bulgaria and $1,532 in Romania to 
the highest at $5,167 in the Czech Republic and $9,039 in Slovenia. This can be 
compared with the EU average of $21,640. Only one of the five current front­
runners for early EU accession, Slovenia, has a per capita GDP approaching 
that of the poorest existing member-state, Portugal ($10,167). The others 
(Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia) are all about half, or well 
below half that.
However, a more encouraging picture is provided by comparative date 
based on purchasing power parities, which give a more realistic impression of 
the differences in the standard of living between countries. This is the basis for 
the data used by the European Commission in its Agenda 2000 report (see table 
2). The socio-economic gap remains formidable, however, and still wider than 
has been the case in any previous enlargement. And while growth has resumed 
in most countries, reaching quite rapid rates in some countries (notably Poland 
and the Baltic Republics), the estimated level of real GDP is still below, even 
well below, its 1989 level in all countries except Poland and Hungary. In other 
words, in quantitative terms, the socio-economic gap appears to be wider today 
than it was ten years ago. Moreover, the sustainability of current growth rates is 
open to question in some countries. The Czech Republic seems set for at least a 
year or two of stagnation following its early apparent success in weathering the 
shock of transition, while Romania’s economy has suffered a sharp downturn 
since 1996.




















































































































































































































































































































































































Average monthly wages at market exchange rates are very low indeed by 
comparison with those of existing member-states, for example, US$102 in 
Bulgaria, US$282 in Hungary, US$383 in Poland, and US$897 in Slovenia, at 
the end of 1997. Unemployment has risen in all countries from virtually zero at 
the end of the communist period to levels approaching, and in some cases 
exceeding, the current EU average. Official figures almost certainly understate 
the extent of the problem. As also applies to unemployment figures in the West, 
the introduction of restrictions on eligibility to register as unemployed, and 
extensive use of early retirement provisions may deflate the real picture. Recent 
trends in some CEE countries to a halt or modest reduction in unemployment 
may not be sustained, given doubts about the sustainability of current growth 
rates; widespread evidence of continued over-employment in some sectors of 
industry and, especially, agriculture; the underdevelopment of active labour 
market policies and mechanisms; and the ever-increasing challenge posed by 
exposure to international competition.
The extent of officially-defined poverty in CEE is quite alarming: for 
example, in Poland, 36 per cent of all employees were found to be below the 
poverty line in 1994. According to household surveys, the number of people 
living below the subsistence minimum in Hungary reached 3 million in 1995, 
over one-third of the total population. A similar proportion was found in 
Romania in 1996, while in Bulgaria, over 70 per cent were living below the 
poverty line in 1998. The low levels of economic development in general, and 
the specific problem of poverty, are undoubtedly factors influencing the wide 
discrepancies between East and West Europe in key social indicators such as 
life expectancy. For example, in 1993, male life expectancy was behind the EU 
average by 8 years in Hungary, 6 years in Romania, 4.6 years in Poland, and 4.3 
years in Bulgaria.
What figures such as these actually imply for our assessment of the socio­
economic gap in an enlarged of the EU, however, is open to debate. They have 
to be set in context by taking into account firstly, the extent of unregistered 
economic activity and the impact of informal social practices; and secondly, by 
assessing the underlying dynamics of socio-economic change in the post­
communist transformation. To what extent do official figures really give us an 
accurate picture of the extent of the socio-economic gap as it stands today? And 
how quickly can we expect the gap to close?
The existence of a sizeable unrecorded "second economy" in CEE long 
pre-dates the transition to the market. Under communist central planning, 
endemic shortages and unreliable supplies of even the most basic goods and 
services drove consumers onto the black market. Low wages in official 




























































































of materials, components etc from the state employer, in order to buy or barter 
for goods unavailable in state shops and pay the bribes necessary to obtain 
services (e.g. housing allocation, health care) provided by state authorities. 
Throughout the region, urban households’ food supplies depended vitally on 
family connections in the countryside, or on the cultivation of allotments on the 
edge of the city. Subsistence farming has been a vital factor in poorer 
economies such as Bulgaria and Romania.
In many respects, the state in "real socialism" proved an unreliable 
guarantor of the secure and steadily rising standard of living it promised. A 
well-known quip of the time was that "he who does not rob the state robs his 
own family". Habits of evasion of the state became at least as deeply entrenched 
as those of dependency on it. Learned self-reliance and individual 
resourcefulness are thus at least as characteristic of the peoples of post­
communist Europe as "learned helplessness", and have clearly been called into 
play in the new conditions of transition to the market economy. Recent 
estimates in Hungary, for example, suggest that unregistered economic activity 
may account for 30-50 per cent of GDP. Whether the unregistered economy has 
become larger or not with the transition to the market is hard to assess. But 
without some reference to its mitigating impact on the socio-economic shocks 
of transition it is hard to explain the extraordinary resilience and stability of the 
societies of the region during the 1990s.
To what extent does this modify the picture given by official statistics of 
the socio-economic gap between East and West? This depends on whether the 
level of unregistered economic activity is in fact higher in CEE countries than 
in the EU. It almost certainly is on the average, although high levels of such 
activity are also estimated in some south European member-states. While 
unregistered activity may modify the official picture as far as the distribution of 
incomes is concerned, it does so in largely unknown and only hazily understood 
ways. There is hardly reason for rejoicing. While unemployment and poverty 
for some groups may be less intolerable than official data would imply, no 
doubt some of the poorest are still excluded from the "second economy" 
through lack of skills, resources and personal connections. On the other hand, 
the incomes of some of those in the highest income brackets may be even 
further augmented.
More important than the effects on the pattern of income distribution, 
however, is the close association between a large "second economy" and 
corruption in government and the state administration. States weakly embedded 
in societies that continue to mistrust and evade them, states captured by the 
interests of narrow self-serving elites, are not going to be in a position to devise 




























































































functioning market economies. They are neither likely to be capable of 
gathering taxes effectively nor of allocating public resources efficiently and 
fairly. They are thus less likely either to deal adequately with the immediate 
needs of their societies, let alone to meet the challenges of eventual integration 
into the EMU. Thus while in certain respects and in the short term, the 
unregistered economy may act as a safety valve for CEE economies in 
transition, taken in a broader perspective and in the longer term, it may signal a 
more intractable source of divergence between East and West Europe than the 
statistically quantifiable gap itself.
Assessments of the prospects for closing the gap between East and West 
in the foreseeable future depend very much on prior assessments of what has so 
far been achieved in the economic transformation in CEE. Have the policies 
pursued since 1989 served to set the economy on a new path, opening the way 
for eventual convergence with the EU? To what extent do legacies from the 
communist past still exert a drag on progress? Has the approach to transition 
created new problems of its own? Some would argue that, having been executed 
at vast and unnecessary social cost, the policies pursued have not lessened the 
gap but widened it, storing up an array of explosive tensions that cannot be 
managed, but could even be further exacerbated, by persisting in the standard 
recipes of liberalisation and adaptation to the demands of the EU’s acquis. 
There are at least two ways of answering these questions, presented below.
The most critical accounts of CEE developments since 1989 present the 
following arguments. The transition policies pursued have failed, as 
demonstrated by the dramatic falls in output of 20-40 per cent in all countries of 
the region in the first two to three years of the transition and slow recovery 
thereafter. The collapse in industrial output has been particularly dramatic, and 
recovery is hampered by lack of expertise in international markets, poorly 
developed commercial infrastructure, inexperienced entrepreneurs, and tight 
monetary policy which starves the economy of credits. Sharp falls in real wages 
and incomes have led to sudden and widespread social impoverishment, a vast 
increase in social and regional inequalities, and a surge in the crime rate. The 
structures of the communist state that provided, however imperfectly, the basic 
essentials of social protection have been dismantled in a reckless pursuit of neo­
liberal dogma, and no adequate replacements have been put in their place. New 
private health insurance and pension schemes are likely to be less efficient than 
the system of publicly financed and state-managed social security and certainly 
more risky. They tend to privilege the already privileged. The NGOs that have 
sprung up in the welfare field are either low-capacity and low-quality 
substitutes for public services, or they favour the rich. The net result of nearly 
ten years of this "leap in the dark" has been a pervasive sense of social 




























































































democratic order itself. CEE is thus converging not on the "European model" 
but on the "Latin American" one.
The alternative view is also critical of progress since 1989, but from the 
opposite perspective: while the basic policies have been correct, they have not 
been implemented consistently enough, and in certain respects, especially in the 
field of social welfare reform, the transition has been "marking time". 
Proponents of this view are more sanguine about the impact of the policies 
pursued in the transition. Some of the decline in output was unavoidable, and 
some is more apparent than real. Communist-era statistics were notorious for 
’padding’, as enterprises had strong incentives to report better results than 
actually achieved. Some output was in fact worthless, unsaleable on world 
markets, environmentally damaging, and even ’value-subtracting’. The 
phenomena of poverty and unemployment had their roots in the former 
communist system. Their recent growth thus represents at least in part merely 
the increased visibility of what was previously hidden.
Moreover, proponents of this line of argument point out that not all post­
communist transitions have had equally deleterious socio-economic 
consequences. The more consistent and determined the liberalism of 
government economic policies, the "softer" the socio-economic impact: 
stabilizing the economy and restarting growth has made possible the recovery of 
wages and incomes, with rising social transfers and improved services. It is 
therefore essential to differentiate between groups of post-communist countries, 
and to avoid sweeping generalisations that confuse the issue.
While some bewail the collapse of the welfare states of CEE, others 
bewail the extent to which they have preserved intact basic features of the 
command economy, such as overcentralisation, waste, rationing, shortage, 
paternalism, rent-seeking, corruption. In this view, it is precisely because of the 
lack of thorough and effective reform that the pension system, health care and 
family allowances (not to mention education) have continued to be biased 
toward the well-to-do.
Far from seeing the citizens of new democracies as yearning to exchange 
their new liberties for a return to greater protection by the state, survey evidence 
can be put forward which demonstrates stronger popular inclinations towards 
individualist than collectivist values. There are thus grounds for hope that 
people can be liberated from their "fiscal illusions", once they are made aware 
that that social services are not "free" and that their taxes are being redistributed 
in ways that have not been negotiated with them. This suggests that reform is 
indeed politically feasible, insofar as the aim is not to suppress welfare 




























































































performance of the economy, to restructure and streamline - in other words, to 
cut back social expenditures now in order to raise them later on. Welfare reform 
in CEE does not inevitably mean "Latin Americanisation", but can be designed 
to be compatible with similar reforms under way in west European models of 
the welfare state.
The reality of what has happened in CEE in transition probably lies 
somewhere between these two polarised, and rather ideologically-driven views. 
Significant change has happened, but it has not necessarily followed the 
trajectory anticipated by the "Grand Project" of transformation. What has taken 
place is a great variety of small transformations, which cumulatively do add up 
to significant change. A whole new range of organisations has emerged for the 
public management of welfare or for private/civic social provision both on 
central and local levels. Their interaction may result in strong institutional 
relations safeguarded by the rule of law as well as by new individual strategies 
and public awareness. At the same time, old institutions, embodied in 
organisations (ministries of social affairs, labour unions, hospitals) or in 
policies, values, habits of mind (the propensity for centralisation, corruption, 
forced solidarity) may show immense resistance to reform. The "communist 
welfare state" is being transformed, but its relatively tightly knit safety net has 
not disappeared. The welfare regimes in CEE have been instrumental in 
cushioning the blows of marketisation and privatisation, not to speak of the 
worst economic recession this century.
Piecemeal, incremental and improvised change - "muddling through" - is 
probably inevitable in the context of a task of such unprecedented scope and 
complexity as the post-communist transformation. It may even be desirable in a 
context of mounting uncertainty concerning the end-state of the transformation 
process: which model of welfare state should CEE countries choose from the 
ever-changing Western menu? Experimentation is no evil. We should be 
prepared for slow and uneven progress, trial-and-error, recognising that minor 
moves, creeping changes can accelerate, cumulate and become irreversible - 
while not forgetting that they can also get diverted and bum out prematurely. 
Keeping change on track is less a matter of having the right all-embracing 
blueprint, than of defining clear priorities which can be realised alongside the 
necessary political compromises.
In conclusion, we can acknowledge that the socio-economic- 
discrepancies between East and West are large, while recognising that precise 
quantitative measurement is problematic. Nevertheless, some CEE states have 
done much better than others, so differentiation is essential. But differentiation 
should not lead to over-optimistic assessments of the extent and future pace of 




























































































average. Recently, faster growth in the front-running transition economies than 
in the EU economy has begun to narrow the gap; but nevertheless progress will 
be gradual, and will certainly not be achieved before accession of the current 
front-runners. Catching up to the EU average by 2015 will require sustained 
levels of growth in the front-running states of 5-9% per annum. Whether such 
levels are feasible has much to do with the terms and conditions of CEE states - 
integration with the EU.
Economic growth is the key to closing the gap in incomes and standards 
of social welfare between East and West. Social reform has so far lagged behind 
economic transformation in CEE. This is not only, and possibly not mainly due 
to the alleged "neo-liberal” bias in policy. It has to do with the lack of resources 
in terms not only financial, but human: the lack of government time and 
attention, low levels of administrative competence, and uncertainty as to the 
appropriate "social model" to be adopted in a changing Europe.
II. What are the Implications for EU Enlargement?
None of the ten associates is currently economically ready for accession in the 
immediate future. This has not, however, prevented the EU and its member- 
states from deciding to go ahead with enlargement, and to begin accession 
negotiations with the five CEE associates deemed to have reasonable prospects 
of meeting the economic requirements for entry early in the next century 
(Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia). The overriding 
arguments in favour of enlargement are recognised as essentially political and 
geo-strategic in character. That said, it remains the case that economics is at the 
core of EU integration. If economics has not been allowed to decide the 
argument for or against enlargement, nevertheless economics does determine 
the pace and methods by which it can be achieved.
It can be argued that the economic benefits of eastward enlargement to 
both the existing EU members and new entrants from CEE outweigh the costs. 
Enlargement provides existing EU member-states’ firms with extensive new 
trading opportunities, and an opportunity to enhance their global 
competitiveness by taking advantage of low-cost, relatively high-skilled labour 
in the new eastern member-states. CEE economic leaders have long argued for 
’trade not aid’: open access to the EU market will promote quicker, more 
effective and sustainable adjustment on the part of their firms than any aid 
programme. This has now been achieved (with the exception of trade in 
agricultural products), with the implementation of the trade provisions of the 
’Europe’ Agreements. Direct investment by western firms - one of the most 




























































































in technology, managerial and commercial know-how. The CEE new entrants 
have good prospects of becoming new ’economic tigers’, a significant 
dynamising factor in the European economy, to the overall benefit of the whole.
But the benefits will inevitably be unevenly distributed among sectors, 
regions and states. Among existing member-states, to judge by the experience 
so far, it has been primarily German and Austrian firms which have seized the 
new opportunities in the east. Other member-states have been slower to 
recognise the potential gains, and public opinion throughout the EU tends to 
focus far more on the costs than the benefits. Opening up to the poorer states of 
the east is seen as a threat especially by less-skilled labour and less dynamic 
economic regions in the west. These face the prospect of competition from 
immigrant workers prepared to work for lower wages, and from the relocation 
of production to the east. The charge of ’social dumping’ will almost inevitably 
be heard, and governments will be pressed to respond. If outright protectionist 
measures are ruled out, the insistence that Central and East European states 
meet the acquis, for example, in the environmental field, in full and without 
transitional arrangements, could have the same effect.
Question marks remain about the capacity of large sectors of industry and 
agriculture in the east to withstand the competitive pressures of full integration 
into the European single market. Rising unemployment could well afflict the 
east more severely than the west. Stagnation in living standards and depressed 
opportunities could prompt emigration of the most valuable, highly skilled 
workers. Even if the socio-economic discrepancies between existing and new 
EU member-states diminish as a result of enlargement, regional inequalities 
within new member-states could well increase, as experience with past 
enlargements has shown.
The political economy of enlargement thus raises the real danger of 
widespread political disillusion in both western and eastern states of the Union. 
In order to head off this danger, the EU has to devise effective social and 
economic policies, and back them up with credible political arguments.
First of all, an appropriate transitional strategy of phased integration of the 
new entrants has to be devised. While existing member-states will no doubt be ready 
to accept this, the temptation to use this as an opportunity to exploit the possibilities 
of the social and environmental acquis to impose high barriers on the new entrants 
has to be avoided. These would only benefit the existing member-states in the short 
term, at the expense of delaying the essential adjustments in the new entrants, and 
throttling their chances of attaining a sustainable path of maximum growth. The long 
term costs of such an approach to the EU as a whole, and in particular to its richer 




























































































At the same time, the new entrants have to be given a clear schedule for 
the phased implementation of the acquis in the course of accession and in the 
years immediately following it. This is necessary not only to bolster the political 
commitment of the governments of new entrants to press on with painful 
reforms and complex adjustments, but also to convince ’threatened’ producers 
and workers in existing member-states that the temporary arrangements are 
finite in duration and will lead to a genuinely level playing-field’ in the shortest 
possible time.
The EU is well placed to assist the new entrants in preparing themselves 
for enlargement, and the accumulated expertise and practical experience it 
possesses in education and training, the development of active employment and 
labour-market policies, institution-building and administrative modernisation 
should be deployed to the full. There may be some resistance on the part of 
member-states to the extension of the EU’s activities into these fields, and there 
is the danger that as a result the EU may become more closely involved in the 
internal affairs of the new member-states than any of the existing member-states 
has been willing to allow. The spectre of a ’two-tier’ Europe once again raises its 
head, and will have to be confronted.
At the same time, the ’second wave’ applicants must be included, in order 
to prevent a further ’tier’ developing in Europe as the integration of ’first wave’ 
applicants procédés. Here, the challenge is to maintain and further develop 
cross-border economic cooperation in the East, which brings benefits to both 
sides. This accelerates integration of the first wave new member-states by 
promoting growth, particularly in their poorer eastern regions; and contributes 
to averting the danger of new barriers, and therefore new political and economic 
tensions between the Central and East European associates, and between them 
and their neighbours to the East. Recent measures imposed by the EU on first 
wave applicants to tighten up the control of their eastern borders have proved 
short-sighted and damaging. A more flexible and productive approach has to be 
found.
Another area where both existing and prospective new member-states 
have much work to do is in the field of combatting corruption and increasing 
transparency in political and economic governance. Collaborative research and 
the elaboration of common policies in this field should be a matter of priority.
Unavoidably, enlargement has implications for the EU budget. To Central 
and East European applicants it seems obvious that enlargement cannot be 
successfully managed without an increased budget, but this seems far from 
obvious to existing member-state governments. Their reluctance to increase the 




























































































comes to reforming the structure of the budget. At present there seems to be 
agreement only that the pattern of the previous enlargements, which absorbed 
poorer new entrants by doubling the size of structural and cohesion funds, will 
not be repeated. It is no doubt true that the world has changed, and that global 
economic realities no longer permit resource transfers on former scales. It can 
also be argued that the results of this expenditure were quite mixed - regional 
disparities within the EU remain wide. Budgetary reform is long overdue and is 
at last under way.
But EU budgetary transfers remain a crucial issue. For all their failings, 
budgetary transfers have played an important role in sustaining the momentum 
of integration after previous enlargements. They brought benefits not only to the 
poorer new entrants, which were compensated for the costs of adopting the 
acquis, but also to the richer existing members, whose problems of sectoral and 
regional adjustment were alleviated. The current logic of budgetary politics in 
the EU may throw the baby out with the bathwater. Not only enlargement but 
also monetary union would appear to require a substantial pool of resources for 
compensatory inter-regional transfers if integration is to be managed politically 
and economically.
An essential point which needs to come across loud and clear in political 
debate among EU member-states and their citizens is that the changes in Europe 
since the collapse of communism inevitably impose new costs, whether the EU 
enlarges or not, whether it takes in only some, or all of the CEE associates. The 
costs of not enlarging, or enlarging only slowly, are likely to be higher for all 
concerned.
Exclusion from the EU undoubtedly slows the pace of economic 
transformation in eastern Europe; while offering a reasonable prospect of 
accession within a specified timescale on clearly defined conditions plays an 
important part in sustaining the commitment of governments and public opinion 
to reform. The unquantifiable, but deeply influential psychological impact of 
being recognised as rightful and respected partners in the ’Grand Project’ of 
constructing a united and free Europe is evident in all the CEE associates.
The political and economic risks of excluding CEE states from EU 
membership are high. Delayed or diverted reforms, slow growth, chronic high 
inflation, stagnant or falling living standards in the east mean high pressures to 
emigration. The fear of ’swamping’ by uncontrolled flows of emigration from 
the east seems much more likely to be realised if CEE states are excluded from 
membership than if they are included. Economic migration tends to happen 
irrespective of the barriers governments try to erect against it. Industrial 




























































































costs in neighbouring CEE states, will happen to a significant extent even if 
enlargement is delayed - indeed much already happened even before 
enlargement came onto the official agenda. However, integration into the EU 
provides a framework which will accelerate foreign investment in CEE and 
encourage larger and more long-term investment projects.
The EU faces the costs of coexisting with fragile new democracies and 
weak transitional economies all around its borders whether it enlarges or not. If 
it enlarges to only a few, say the first five now beginning accession 
negotiations, it will have to take on the costs of managing a new division in 
Europe which separates states whose histories and peoples are inextricably tied 
together (Poland with Lithuania and Ukraine, the Czech Republic with 
Slovakia, Hungary with its neighbours where large Hungarian minorities exist). 
When it later enlarges further to include all the CEE associates, it will have to 
develop new policies to bridge the gap with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, 
and the successor states of former Yugoslavia, now directly on its borders.
The EU member-states and their citizens would be deceiving themselves 
if they believe the challenge of responding to the new realities of post-Cold War 
Europe consists merely in their digging deeper into their pockets and being 
generous towards their less fortunate neighbours. The challenge is in fact to 
convince themselves that new costs are unavoidable, and therefore that it is in 
their own interests to summon the political will to make enlargement work. 
New expenditure is necessary - of energy and imagination in the search for new 
European solutions. This the best means we have of managing the new political 
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